Last Updated September 7, 2015
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Israeli raid on Gaza aid flotilla broke law – UN probe
Human Rights situation in Palestine and other Occupied Arab territories – United Nations
V. Conclusions
260. The attack on the flotilla must be viewed in the context of the ongoing problems between the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority and People. In carrying out its task, the Mission was exposed to the depth of conviction on both sides of the correctness of their respective positions. Similar disasters are likely to reoccur unless there is a dramatic shift in the existing paradigm. It must be remembered that might and strength are enhanced when attended by a sense of justice and fair play. Peace and respect have to be earned not bludgeoned out of any opponent. An unfair victory has never been known to bring lasting peace.
261. The Mission has come to the firm conclusion that a humanitarian crisis existed on the 31 May 2010 in Gaza. The preponderance of evidence from impeccable sources is far too overwhelming to come to a contrary opinion. Any denial that this is so cannot be supported on any rational grounds. One of the consequences flowing from this is that for this reason alone the blockade is unlawful and cannot be sustained in law. This is so regardless of the grounds on which it is sought to justify the legality of the blockade.
262. Certain results flow from this conclusion. Principally, the action of the IDF in intercepting the Mavi Marmara in the circumstances and for the reasons given on the high sea was clearly unlawful. Specifically, the action cannot be justified in the circumstances even under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
263. Israel seeks to justify the blockade on security grounds. The State of Israel is entitled to peace and security like any other. The firing of rockets and other munitions of war into Israeli territory from Gaza constitutes serious violations of international and international humanitarian law. But action in response which constitutes collective punishment of the civilian population in Gaza is not lawful in the present or any circumstances.
264. The conduct of the Israeli military and other personnel towards the flotilla
passengers was not only disproportionate to the occasion but demonstrated levels of totally unnecessary and incredible violence. It betrayed an unacceptable level of brutality. Such conduct cannot be justified or condoned on security or any other grounds. It constituted grave violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law.
265. The Mission considers that several violations and offences have been committed. It is not satisfied that, in the time available, it can say that it has been able to compile a comprehensive list of all offences. However, there is clear evidence to support prosecutions of the following crimes within the terms of article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention:
- wilful killing;
- torture or inhuman treatment;
- wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.
The Mission also considers that a series of violations of Israel’s obligations under international human rights law have taken place, including:
- right to life (article 6, ICCPR);
- torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 7,
- ICCPR; CAT);
Israeli doctors’ group wins ‘alternative’ Nobel prize
Campaigning doctors
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Posted: August 31, 2010 02:58 PM by
Khaled Meshaal Interview: Hamas Chief Weighs In on Eve of Peace Talks (PART 1)
With pundits in most capitals already predicting failure for the US-brokered Palestinian-Israeli peace talks to begin on Thursday, it seems only natural to start asking the question: “What’s next?” To get a jumpstart on what surely will be an onslaught of new, competing narratives vying for prominence in the post-peace process era, I headed to Damascus to talk to a man who has predicted the failure of this process from the start. And yet who — against all logic — has never been invited to sit at the negotiating table. Khaled Meshaal, head of Hamas’ political bureau, is an unassuming man who sauntered into our interview room unattended and chatted with me in English while we awaited his staff. The young father of seven — three daughters and four sons, in that order — is grounded, smart and energetic. We met at 1:00 a.m. when I was fading fast, and he was just getting started. There was a lot of ground to cover, but more than anything I wanted to leave the interview knowing what Hamas stood for. The resistance group, I felt, had left people confused in recent years. By moderating their stances and altering their language to accommodate changing realities in the Middle East, Hamas had become a bit blurry at the edges. Do they recognize a two-state solution? Do they reject the peace process outright? What do they think about the role and imperatives of the international community in resolving the longstanding conflict between Palestinians and Israelis? And most importantly for me — how does one today define an organization that has evolved so much since its inception?
Firstly, Hamas is clearly a national liberation movement that has at it roots a “resistance” outlook. It’s focus is the liberation of Palestine from Israeli occupation, and the group’s Islamist character complements rather than competes with Hamas’ political objectives. Secondly, Hamas’ resistance of occupation is at the heart of its strategies — be they efforts to reach out and engage, or to take up arms. The strategy may change with evolving regional and global realities, but the group’s objectives stand firm. In a nutshell: While the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority enables Israel to enjoy a pressure-free occupation, Hamas ensures that Israel’s occupation remains always under pressure. And so we come to this last leg of the US-brokered peace process. Ostensibly, under the internationally-sanctioned land-for-peace formula, a major goal of negotiations is to end Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands. So why then would Hamas not stand fully behind a peace process that sought to accomplish some of its very own goals? And why too would US mediators not invite the participation of a group that won the Palestinian popular vote in their last elections?
Here is what Khaled Meshaal had to say about the prospects and challenges of peace, and where we find ourselves at this moment, on the eve of direct peace talks:
SN: The peace process has been going on for 19 years — what in your view has been the major reason for its failure thus far?
KM: Three reasons. First of all, Israel does not want peace. They talk about peace but they are not ready to pay the price of peace. The second reason is that the Palestinian negotiator does not have strong cards in his hand to push the peace process forward. The third reason is that the international community does not have the capability or the desire to push Israel towards peace.
SN: On Thursday, direct talks begin again between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel — the US has worked hard to bring this about. What are your thoughts on this round, the US’ role and prospects for a breakthrough?
KM: These negotiations are taking place for American and Israeli considerations, calculations and interests only. There are no interests at all for us as Palestinians or Arabs. That’s why the negotiations can only be conducted under American orders, threats and pressure exerted on the PA and some Arab countries.
The negotiations are neither supported nationally nor are they perceived as legitimate by the authoritative Palestinian institutions. They are rejected by most of the Palestinian factions, powers, personalities, elites, and regular people — that is why these “peace talks” are destined for failure. This represents a perfect example of how the US administration deals with the Arab-Israeli conflict — how American policy appears to be based on temporary troubleshooting instead of working toward finding a real and lasting solution.
Consecutive US administrations have adopted this same policy of “managing conflict” instead of “resolving conflict.” This can be useful for American tactical and short-term purposes, but it is very dangerous on the long-term and the strategic levels. This approach will ultimately prove catastrophic for the region.
SN: There is debate about whether Hamas accepts the premise of a two-state solution — your language seems often vague and heavily nuanced. I want to ask if you could clarify, but I am also curious as to whether it is even worth accepting a two-state solution today when there has been so much land confiscation and settlement activity by Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusalem?
KM: Hamas does accept a Palestinian state on the lines of 1967 — and does not accept the two-state solution.
SN: What is the difference between the two?
KM: There is big difference between these two. I am a Palestinian. I am a Palestinian leader. I am concerned with accomplishing what the Palestinian people are looking for — which is to get rid of the occupation, attain liberation and freedom, and establish the Palestinian state on the lines of 1967. Talking about Israel is not relevant to me — I am not concerned about it. It is an occupying state, and I am the victim. I am the victim of the occupation; I am not concerned with giving legitimacy to this occupying country. The international community can deal with this (Israeli) state; I am concerned with the Palestinian people. I am as a Palestinian concerned with establishing the Palestinian state only.
SN: Can you clarify further? As a Palestinian leader of the Resistance you have to give people an idea of what you aspire to — and how you expect to attain it?
KM: For us, the 20 years of experience with these peace negotiations — and the failure of it — very much convinces us today that the legitimate rights of Palestinians will be only be gained by snatching them, not by being gifted with them at the negotiating table. Neither Netanyahu nor any other Israeli leader will ever simply gift us a Palestinian state. The Palestinian Authority has watered down all its demands and is merely asking for a frame of reference to the 1967 borders in negotiations, but Netanyahu has repeatedly refused to accept even this most basic premise for peace. Nor will America or the international community gift us with a state — we have to depend on ourselves and help ourselves.
As a Palestinian leader, I tell my people that the Palestinian state and Palestinian rights will not be accomplished through this peace process — but it will be accomplished by force, and it will be accomplished by resistance. I tell them that through this bitter experience of long negotiations with the Israelis, we got nothing — we could not even get the 1967 solution. I tell them the only option in front of us today is to take this by force and by resistance. And the Palestinian people today realize this — yes, it has a steep price, but there is no other option for the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people tried the peace process option but the result was nothing.
SN: While Hamas has not been a participant in the peace process, many of the Arab nations have pushed for these very negotiations. So then why have they persisted with these talks if most of them think the process is futile?
KM: This bloc (of Arab nations) which has pursued the peace process strategy with Israel is ready to continue with habitual and continuous negotiations without even a single outcome. They will continue with this peace process with Israel because they are not ready to turn to the other option.
SN: And the other option is?
KM: The confrontation of Israel. The other option is resistance — which will gain the strong cards to pressurize Israel. In short, a weak party (this Arab bloc) will adopt a course of action though he knows that he will see no positive outcome, as he does not have his own strength and has no strong cards. At the same time there is also a great pressure on The Resistance from America and Israel in order to prevent our success. If the peace process is blocked without hope, there is no option for the Palestinian people — for the people of the region — but the option of continuing with resistance, even though they realize the pressure that will come, and even though they realize there is a conspiracy against The Resistance.
SN: Well one of these Arab nations that keeps pushing for the peace process is Egypt. Egypt is also a party to the siege of Gaza. And yet Hamas accepts the decision of the Arab League to choose Egypt to mediate reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Why did Hamas accept Egypt as a mediator?
KM: There is no doubt we have differences with Egypt regarding many of its political positions and decisions. But the reasons for Egypt’s mediation of reconciliation talks are different. The first is that Egypt is a major country in the region — it is not easy for other nations to just bypass them on any issue. The second reason goes back to geopolitics and the history between Palestine and Egypt, which make Egypt more vested in the Palestinian issue than virtually any other country.
The third reason is that the reconciliation itself consists of two parties — Hamas and Fatah. No mediator in this reconciliation effort will succeed unless both groups agree to their participation. Fatah simply refuses the intervention of any other Arab country as this will anger Egypt. We in Hamas do not refuse Egypt as the caretaker for the mediation — what is important for us is not whether we have X or Y as the mediator, what is important to us is that reconciliation itself has to be advanced in a correct way. And it was evident in the last round that the main impediment to this reconciliation is American interference.
SN: But then does reconciliation become impossible if Egyptians always cave to US pressure?
KM: Yes, there is an American pressure where Egypt is concerned. Mahmoud Abbas is also acquiescing to that same pressure and this undoubtedly makes the reconciliation more difficult.
SN: Why, in your view, does the West not engage directly with Hamas and make you a partner to the solution? Surely the only path to a comprehensive peace is a solution agreed upon by all major parties to a conflict?
KM: The West is trying — either because it lacks the capability or desire — to get somewhere in the region through pressuring the Palestinian side, and not pressuring the Israeli side. The Americans are still convinced today that if they continue pressuring the Palestinian and Arab negotiators — and not get Israel angry — they can reach some breakthrough through this process. The time is coming when they will reach a dead-end because the Palestinian people will simply not agree to any solution which will not provide for all their legitimate rights.
SN: Well some Palestinians would. It appears that the Palestinian Authority is prepared to strike a deal that does not address the Palestinian refugees’ right of return. But could that be a real solution?
KM: I am talking about a majority of Palestinians — not the few. The Palestinian Authority cannot reach a solution with the Israelis without the approval of the majority. Any rightful representatives of the people will advocate for, and not disregard, the Palestinian people’s ambitions and legitimate rights. In short, the West will discover sooner or later that any solution that will not fulfill the rights of the Palestinian people will not be successful and will not be implemented. In that very particular instance, when they finally decide to respect the desires and ambitions of the Palestinian people, they will decide to engage with the Hamas movement. To clarify… though we are open to them, the key for the success of any solution is not through the West or the Americans — we believe that the key to success will come through pursuing our national rights. The change will be made from within the region — whether America is satisfied or not — because anyone who is awaiting change from the West today will not get any change.
SN: There are rumors that Hamas has been secretly talking to US officials for about two years — is there any truth to this?
KM: We don’t have any interest in concealing official meetings if they take place. Essentially speaking, there are no official or direct talks with the US administration, except for some meetings that happened at the side of some conference in Doha with low-profile individuals, and we do not consider these direct or official talks with the administration. But we do consider some of these meetings as indirect talks — we know very well that some non-US officials we meet with report to the administration. And yes, we have met some former Democrat and Republican officials, and we know that they too report to the administration. We are interested in meeting with the Americans and the West, but we do not beg for these meetings and we are not in a hurry.
Khaled Meshaal Interview: Hamas Chief Weighs In on Eve of Peace Talks (PART 2)
Palestinian resistance group Hamas has beaten some unusual odds to survive today: Israel’s unlawful siege of Gaza has crippled the coastal strip’s economy and left Hamas scrambling to govern a restless population living under increasingly desperate conditions. Its officials and members are targeted by Israel and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) for detention, torture and extrajudicial killings. Pro-US Arab leaders undermine it at every turn, partly to satisfy American demands, partly because they fear the widespread popularity of any moderate Islamist resistance group among their own populations. Classified by the US as a “terrorist” organization, Hamas has spent the past year battling armed Salafist extremists who want to enforce Islamic law in the Gaza Strip and who view the Hamas leadership as too weak-willed to challenge Israel’s occupation of Palestine. It is ironic that Hamas today is criticized for being hardline — and liberal too. Militant — and not militant enough. Islamist — and not Islamist enough. Iranian stooges — and US pawns, both. I expected to see some of these contradictions in Khaled Meshaal, head of Hamas’ political bureau, when I interviewed him in Damascus recently. What I discovered instead is that, like a select crop of leaders we are seeing in the Middle East today, Meshaal refuses to be seen through one lens only.
A real challenge for US policymakers with their unidimensional approach to regional politics.The former high school physics teacher convincingly argues that the New Middle East is one where nations need to keep their “options open.” He rejects a regional status-quo where countries stay in “blocs” unthinkingly, and vehemently argues against the notion that Mideast democracy and reform cannot advance unless foreign intervention ends. Meshaal may be more of a geopolitical strategist than suspected, but he also manages to stay infuriatingly “on message” most of the time — never a fun thing when you would love a stray impolitic anecdote. Toward the end of our discussion I asked him about his rumored stash of Dubya jokes, and received nothing but a twinkle in his eye in return, though I could swear he almost caved. But Hamas’ goal to end Israel’s occupation of Palestine is no laughing matter, and Meshaal’s earnest focus reflects the gravity of events in the Mideast today. In Part 1 of the interview seen here, he addresses the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Hamas’ perspective on the recently launched peace talks. This time around, Khaled Meshaal talks about broader regional issues, including the emergence of the “Resistance Bloc,” the New Middle East, relations with Iran, the Ground Zero mosque…and on a more personal note, his relationship with his father:
SN: The “Resistance Bloc” in the Middle East – Syria, Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas – how did it come about?
KM: The forming of this bloc is a natural consequence of events in the region – firstly, the presence of Israel and its atrocities against the region, and then the failure of the negotiation process to achieve something substantial. Even when the Arabs compromised and agreed to the borders of 1967, they did not receive a serious response from Israel. Thus, we have this stalemated situation where Israel has a free hand to do whatever it wants – with the world community turning a blind eye – which leads to the response in the street and to the forming of the bloc you have mentioned. So there is a vacuum. There is a fiasco. There is a frustration. There is an increasing fury and anger among the masses. And now, embarrassment at the official level in the region. There is also the emergence of resistance in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. This resistance keeps standing up to Israel and keeps developing its capabilities – as you can see, they accomplished some successful results in Gaza and in Southern Lebanon. Resistance has therefore become an attractive model for states in the region. This naturally created an environment conducive to the forming of this bloc.
SN: You mention Israel as a key reason for this Resistence Bloc forming in the Middle East. But I believe this “bloc” has more than just four members – it is more of a “Worldview” which includes Qatar, Turkey, maybe Oman, Iraq and others – the one common denominator being “the desire for a state to act in its own self-interest.” Israel may have been a trigger for this Worldview emerging in parts of the Mideast, but how does a country like Qatar for instance get drawn in?
KM: You got this in the same context as I wish to continue. Look at a country like Qatar – it has good relations with the United States, used to have a degree of relations with Israel until the Gaza War, and is considered to be a moderate and liberal state. Qatar’s foreign policy is being formed by the views of its leader, the Emir. The situation in the region created a belief, for a country like Qatar, that if it wants to have a role in the region, it has to open up its options in all directions. The one who keeps himself away from the relevant elements in the region, he won’t be relevant himself. In Qatar you have this leadership – someone who is smart and courageous like the Emir. He understands and realizes full well the aspirations and the mood of his own people and the people of the region. So he adopts those issues and causes which are popular among his constituencies, among those nations – which works well if those issues are already close to his own beliefs and his own interests. Keeping in mind that other Arab countries have for decades been unable to present a successful model that is attractive for others to adopt, this new regional state model has thrived in recent years. These countries – Qatar, Iran, Syria, Sudan, Turkey – share some common elements, but they are not identical to each other. They each have their own modus operandi and interests. Something these nations do share, however, is the self-desire to develop this new trend, but at the same time to remain open – not closed or bound – to enjoying options.
SN: Not dogmatic, as in the past…
KM: …ah yes, not like that. Why should we be dividing ourselves into two blocs – either being against America and the West, or acquiescing 100% to them?
The people in the region, they are looking for leadership to match their own aspirations and ambitions. In a way we need a model where democracy is there, internal reform, successful economy, justice at the social level – and at the same time, there is independence in their political decisions, away from acquiescing to the threats of Israel – and not being a proxy to foreign, American and Western policies. We do not want to wage a war against the world. Or to sever relations with countries. So the nations and the people of the region want a state model based on self respect – without any enmity with the world.
SN: But is it possible to make progress in domestic reforms before foreign interference in the region stops?
KM: My view is that no doubt the foreign intervention is an impediment and has its own negative repercussions. But of course it cannot stop our internal reforms….
SN: It completely stopped the Palestinian democratic process…
KM: The Palestinian situation is different because we are under occupation and don’t have a state. I am talking about stable countries in the region. They have no excuse not to have their own democratic models and reforms — even with foreign intervention — and Turkey is an example of that. Any leadership that genuinely desires to make internal change will do it irrespective of obstacles or foreign intervention. Otherwise if we acquiesce to the notion that the foreign element is the decisive factor in a process for transformation, we will never have democracy, reform, social justice and vibrant economies in this part of the world. In Hamas, we know very well how the intervention of Americans, Israelis and other international actors has had a significant impact on the Palestinian situation — especially if we talk about the control of money and financial assistance. Finances have had a direct impact on Palestinian politics, which is why the Palestinian Authority — Salam Fayyad, Mahmoud Abbas – is very weak. Hamas realizes the impact of this element on us and on the Palestinian situation, but we will not acquiesce to it.
SN: Do you think Hamas’ more conciliatory positions in recent years has “watered down” your organization? Have any of these efforts reaped any rewards for you whatsoever?
KM: The “openness” which you acknowledge yourself, comes neither from changing Hamas’ position nor from acquiescing to external pressures — this openness is part of Hamas’ strategy: On the one hand, we have remained steadfast in our determination to attain the legitimate national rights of our people and to continue the resistance. On the other hand, in politics, we proceed with an open mind. How do we do this? I restrict my battle to Israel only. Our battle is not with the United States of America — nor with the West. Yes, the American policies and some Western policies are hostile to us, but there is still no way that my battle is with them. So I am open – I can talk and I can engage in dialogue with the West and with the Americans. But I will not acquiesce to them. We have confidence in ourselves and independence in our decisions – we will not be a proxy for anybody, and our enemy is only restricted to the occupation – to the Israelis.
SN: Ok, but in all fairness, Hamas once was in large part about armed resistance like Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is still today. There are all these demands on Hamas from the international community today — to accept the Quartet Principles, accepting all the treaties, recognizing Israel, renouncing violence, etc. So your efforts to engage has landed you somewhere between PIJ and Fatah — and not so distinguishable any longer. I know exactly what those two organizations are about — but Hamas…not so much.
KM: You want a very distinctive or explicit answer. Either you adopt this track or that track. What you are suggesting in your question is not what Hamas desires.
Firstly, Hamas did not reduce its level of resistance because we wanted to present some flexibility with the Quartet conditions, or even to satisfy the West. The level of resistance diminished because of very objective field conditions inside Palestine. This goes for Hamas, Islamic Jihad — for everybody. I mean it wasn’t our political decision to downsize the resistance, but it happened because of the significant security pressures in the field — security pressures from both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Secondly, Hamas is not practicing being a “moderate” movement to satisfy the other side or expecting something in return from the West — not at all — it is part of our own personality, our creed, the strategy we believe in. The West will decide to engage with Hamas when they are convinced that they will not achieve anything in the region without engaging with Hamas. And this time is coming.
SN: Israel is helping you a great deal these days, it seems? They are drawing censure from all quarters about their behaviors since the Gaza war, flotilla killings, Mabhouh assassination, settlement activity, destruction of the Bedouin communities in the Negev, etc.
KM: Yes of course, Israel is acting against its own interest. They want more regional hegemony, more power. They commit fatal mistakes against themselves, leaving no future for Israel. Occupation has no future, occupation will never be legitimized. It is only the weak people who live this fallacy, these false dreams — and we are not weak. We are realistic and so we will achieve our ambitions. Yes, today Israel is more powerful than us – the balance of power is not in our favor today. There is a Palestinian and Arab weakness, there is an American bias, there is weakness in the international community’s plans, but nevertheless the Palestinian people will ultimately win.
SN: Your political foe today — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — was also prime minister in 1996 when he ordered your assassination. The attempted killing drew the direct intervention of US President Bill Clinton and Jordan’s King Hussein who forced Netanyahu to provide an antidote for the toxin administered to you by Mossad agents. Politically, Netanyahu is your enemy — but what are your emotions toward this man on a personal level?
KM: I say but the truth, so you must believe me. For me there is nothing personal, there is no single personal feeling toward him — the only feeling I have is regarding his position towards my people. He is my enemy. Not because he tried to assassinate me – but because he is occupying my land. He is killing my people. Other than that dimension of being an enemy, an occupier in my homeland — I don’t have any additional personal feelings about him. I consider myself bigger than this — than having a personal clash with him. The suffering of my people is more important than my own suffering. The most important lesson out of this assassination attempt for me is that every individual has a pre-decided “time” from the almighty Allah, whether he dies in an assassination attempt or in his bed. If anything, this incident has made me more brave. We have a proverb which says “courage will never be a reason to shorten your life, nor would cowardliness be a reason to extend it.”
SN: The war drums are beating against Iran — what are your thoughts on this?
KM: At the Israeli level it’s increasing and worsening, but I believe that it will need some time at the American level. I believe that Israel will need American support to wage a war. The Israelis will not be in need for direct support of the Americans for the war on Lebanon, but they will for a war on Iran.
Israel does not want peace. Israelis — historically speaking — live on wars and battles. The failure of Israel in the last two wars, in Southern Lebanon and in Gaza, reinforces this image in front of the world. They want to save their face, they want to change the history — hence they are preparing for wars.
SN: We are often told that Hezbollah and Hamas take marching orders from Iran, and that Iran plans to use you folks in a proxy war against Israel. So let me ask you this…If Israel launched a military attack against Iran, how would Hamas react?
KM: We are not agents for anybody. We are not tools in the hands of the others. For sure we, Hezbollah, Iran and Syria have many things in common — especially in terms of resistance — but just as certainly, we are not a proxy for anybody, nor do we plan wars in other states. Hamas is not a “superpower” that can intervene to defend Hezbollah or Syria or Iran. Israel and America try to portray this — that we are proxies for each other — but this is very unrealistic.
SN: When you went to Saudi Arabia recently, Saudi Prince Faisal asked you whether you chose Iranians over Arabs….
KM: Correction – he asked whether our relations with Iran were at the expense of our relations with the Arabs and the Palestinian national interest. I told him: “yes, we have relations with Iran and will do so with whomever supports us. We will say thank you to them, but this is not at the expense of our Arab relations.” We are a resistance movement, open to the Arabs, to the Muslims and to all countries in the world, and we are not part of any agenda for regional forces.
SN: A senior member of the Islamic Action Front in Jordan told me that in the first year after the Iranian revolution, 80 books were published on the Shia but that there had only been three, maybe four, such books published in the decades before the revolution. This division between Muslims continues to be exploited by different parties — what can be done to diffuse this situation?
KM: You know the differences between the Sunni and the Shia is very well established historically, and it is still present today. But how to address this situation? Yes, some of the International parties they try to exploit to do as you say: divide and rule. And some parties in the region, official and non-official entities both, yes they want to make it a reason for war between the two worlds — a sectarian battle — between Shia and Sunni.
We, in Hamas, see ourselves — Sunni and Shia — as different sectarian-wise, but all part of one world. So we have to accommodate this difference and be united to confront the foreign enemy.
SN: Have you been reading about the Ground Zero mosque controversy in New York city? What are your thoughts on this very sensitive debate in the United States?
KM: Naturally speaking, America has to be in harmony with its own declared values. It’s not fitting or appropriate for Americans – under the guise of an anti-terrorism war – to fight Muslims by restricting them in their rituals or religious practice. One of your citizenship rights is to practice your religion. If they are American and they are Muslim American, they have the right to build a mosque as part of their citizenship rights.
In short, aside from the political differences, the freedom of practicing religious rituals and having religious freedom — for all religions — should be granted without having disparity or political differences brought into it.
SN: Not too long ago, I was talking to someone from the US Military’s CENTCOM who lamented the fact that there was never very much information available about the “personalities” of the Resistance leadership — he enjoyed the fact that Hezbollah’s foreign relations chief revealed in an earlier interview that he sometimes watches the Oprah Winfrey show with his wife. So I promised I would ask one personal question on his behalf, and it is this: What was your relationship with your father like growing up?
KM: Tell him to meet me and I will explain everything! I am the eldest son of my father. We were 11 children, and being the eldest made it a special relationship. In our culture, when a man or woman becomes a parent, they are nicknamed after their first-born child, and my father was therefore called “Abu Khaled” or “father of Khaled” his whole life. My father fought the British Mandate and the Israeli terror gangs like Stern and Irgun. This is one of the influences that passed from my father to myself — I have taken that spirit of resistance from him. And of course, within part of our Islamic and Arab culture, the deep emotional relationship between father and son — this is also part of it. My father passed on many of his qualities to me — resistance; the practice of religion; courage and resolve; a democratic soul. He was very fair in his approach within the family, inside the home. He used to give us freedom and it has had its own impact on my upbringing. The child that gets such a democratic atmosphere will have more confidence in his or her decisions. Since I was a young boy, my father gave me complete liberty — I have now brought the same policy to my own seven children. My father was also a leader in his tribe, and with the clans and families at a social level. In a way he was a reference for our town on social affairs, so one major part of his personality was to be open to all horizons for the benefit of the family and the town. I was brought up with this environment, and I got this openness from my relationship with him.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharmine-narwani/khaled-meshaal-on-hamas-a_b_738758.html
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Israeli forces ‘Tasered’ activist on Gaza aid boat
29 September 2010 Last updated at 21:22
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